Why does education reduce crime? by Bell, Brian et al.
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1566 
August 2018 
Why Does Education Reduce Crime? 
Brian Bell 
Rui Costa 
Stephen Machin 
    
Abstract 
Prior research shows reduced criminality to be a beneficial consequence of education policies that raise 
the school leaving age. This paper studies how crime reductions occurred in a sequence of state-level 
dropout age reforms enacted between 1980 and 2010 in the United States. These reforms changed the 
shape of crime-age profiles, reflecting both a temporary incapacitation effect and a more sustained, 
longer run crime reducing effect. In contrast to the previous research looking at earlier US education 
reforms, crime reduction does not arise solely as a result of education improvements, and so the 
observed longer run effect is interpreted as dynamic incapacitation. Additional evidence based on 
longitudinal data combined with an education reform from a different setting in Australia corroborates 
the finding of dynamic incapacitation underpinning education policy-induced crime reduction. 
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1. Introduction
For most crime types and in different settings, an established research finding is that 
education lowers criminality. In the causal crime-education literature, this finding frequently 
emerges in studies when school dropout age increases resulting from changes made to 
compulsory school leaving (CSL) laws simultaneously boost education and reduce crime.1 
What is currently much less well understood is how this education policy-induced crime 
reduction comes about. In this paper, we argue that additional insight can be gained by zooming 
in on policy-induced shifts in the age structure of criminality that occur from the enactment 
and implementation of CSL laws. In particular, the scope for law changes to differentially 
affect crime-age profiles is studied as a means to better understand empirically the reasons why 
education lowers crime.  
To date, the impact of CSL laws on the age structure of crime has featured in two 
strands of research in the economics of crime. The first of these argues that the crime reduction 
from CSL law changes reflect an incapacitation effect which keeps children in the classroom 
to an older age (and so off the streets not committing crime) – see Anderson (2014) for US 
research on this. Other studies of juvenile crime by Jacob and Lefgren (2003) and Luallen 
(2006) look at teacher strikes and calendar year changes respectively to show that changes in 
the requirement to be in school on a particular day have effects on crime that can plausibly be 
considered as incapacitation.2 
A second strand asks the question whether extra time spent in the education system 
induced by CSL law changes has a longer term effect on an individual's productivity. The extra 
education can enhance future labour market prospects, and so deterring individuals affected by 
1
 Such law changes have been studied in a range of settings to show that a beneficial unintended consequence of 
them is reduced criminality  - see, inter alia, Lochner and Moretti (2004), Machin, Marie and Vujic (2011), 
Hjalmarsson, Holmlund and Lindquist (2015) and Bell, Costa and Machin (2016). 
2
 Other research has considered different forms of incapacitation, for example conscription (Galiani, Rossi and 
Schargrodsky, 2011), teen pregnancy (Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2008) and violent movie screenings (Dahl 
and DellaVigna, 2009). 
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the policy change from entering a life of crime. Indeed, evidence of longer term benefits of 
crime reduction are provided by papers that study the causal impact of education on crime 
working through schooling laws for people who are old enough to have left the education 
system (Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Machin, Marie and Vujic, 2011; Bell, Costa and Machin, 
2016). 
To date, most existing research has focused on one or the other of these by studying 
either direct incapacitation effects or longer-term effects, rather than examining both within 
the same empirical setting. In this paper we look at both in a unifying framework, and use this 
to draw implications from the findings about the means by which education reduces crime. 
This is done in practice by developing a research design that focusses in detail on the way in 
which CSL law changes alter the shape and structure of crime-age profiles. 
This research approach generalises the way in which an education impact on crime can 
be empirically studied by directly testing whether crime-age profiles adapt in the face of policy-
induced changes in the compulsory school leaving age. The focus is on a more flexible 
specification of the crime reduced form than has generally been used by researchers in the 
causal crime literature. This reduced form is modified to study the changing nature of crime-
age profiles in a multiple regression discontinuity framework studying US state-level changes 
in the compulsory school leaving age. 
Evidence from the school dropout age reforms enacted in the last four decades in the 
United States shows that these policies have significantly altered crime-age profiles. This 
change in the shape is shown to be consistent with there being both a temporary incapacitation 
effect and a more sustained, post-incapacitation age crime reducing effect. These combine to 
generate sizable crime reductions from school dropout age policy reforms.3 In contrast to the 
3
 Without placing as much focus on the scope to affect crime-age profiles Chan (2012) also studies crime reduced 
forms using US data. A related paper, based upon Danish register data, is Landerso,  Nielsen and Simonsen (2017) 
which studies the crime impact of reforming age of school entry. 
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previous research on earlier US reforms this does not arise solely as a result of education 
improvements, and so the evidence of a longer run effect is interpreted as dynamic 
incapacitation. Additional evidence based on longitudinal data from a different setting, in 
Queensland, Australia, which permits the analysis of intensive and extensive crime 
participation by individuals corroborates the finding of dynamic incapacitation underpinning 
education policy-induced crime reduction. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 first discusses crime-age profiles 
and then sets up a framework for thinking about how changes in school leaving ages may have 
scope to shift and alter the profile structure and shape. Section 3 describes the data that are 
used, offers some initial descriptive data analysis on compulsory school leaving laws and 
presents the research design used in the empirical work contained in the paper. Section 4 reports 
the main results on the impact of dropout age reforms on crime-age profiles. Section 5 provides 
further discussion, examines evidence on the mechanisms by which dropout reforms reduce 
criminality and presents corroborative evidence based on Australian longitudinal data. Section 
6 offers conclusions. 
2. A Framework for studying crime-age profiles and education policy
Crime-Age Profiles 
The crime-age profile is a well-established empirical regularity. Almost two hundred 
years ago, Adolphe Quetelet presented evidence that crime in early nineteenth-century France 
peaked when individuals were in their late teens (Quetelet, 1831). Subsequent research has 
confirmed the existence of a strong crime-age pattern in many settings, with crime peaking in 
the late teens and declining quite rapidly thereafter.4  
4
 Sullivan (2012) offers a theoretical review and Siennick and Osgood (2008) present a review of empirical work 
and findings. 
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Figure 1 shows this for US males using arrest rates, with a peak rate at age 18 and 
declines thereafter. In a well-known study, Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) conjecture that 
crime-age profiles are broadly invariant over time and space. They suggest criminals can be 
identified by their lack of self-control, that this characteristic is determined well before 
adolescence, and it subsequently persists throughout life. At first sight such a hypothesis would 
seem to imply that the crime-age profile should be reasonably flat. To avoid this conclusion, 
Hirschi and Gottfredson suggest that offenders burn-out over time – maturation – and that 
exposure to criminal opportunities decline as activity patterns change with age. By contrast, 
Sampson and Laub (1993, 2005) focus on the life-course of criminal activity and highlight how 
events such as family, relationships, schooling and employment change as one ages. These life 
cycle dynamics of crime generate the crime-age profile, with the inverse U-shape coming about 
from patterns of crime onset, specialisation and desistence that occur as individual’s age.  
A large body of evidence in criminology has tried to assess the relative merits of these 
different views. Greenberg (1985) presents evidence that both the peak crime age and the rate 
of subsequent decline differs across crime types, localities, race and gender, whilst Hansen 
(2003) shows that the crime-age profile differs for those who leave school at the compulsory 
school leaving age and those who remain in education. Further discussion and additional 
evidence is given in Cohen and Vila (1996), and the meta-study of Pratt and Cullen (2000). 
In the economics literature, Grogger (1998) examines how changing returns to legal 
activity can affect the shape of the crime-age profile, whilst Lochner (2004) uses a human-
capital model to show that crime should indeed peak at around the time of labour market entry. 
More recently, Bindler and Hjalmarsson (2017) consider convictions from 19th century London 
to show that there was a U-shaped trend in the average age of male convicts over the century. 
They suggest that increased use of prison sentences, as opposed to the death penalty and penal 
transportation, may have raised the average age of conviction as a result of a rise of recidivism. 
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A Model of Education Policy and Crime-Age Profiles 
Since Becker (1968) formalized the economic approach to studying criminal behaviour, 
a variety of models have been developed in attempts to better help understand what lies behind 
individual criminality. Work by Ehrlich (1973), Witte (1980), and Witte and Tauchen (1994) 
thinks of engagement in crime as an allocation of time decision. More recently, dynamic 
aspects have been included so as to more clearly represent life-course profiles of crime. The 
notion of criminal capital being a substitute for human capital, which can improve an 
individual’s prospects in the crime market vis-a-vis the labour market, has been a central 
feature (see, for example, Lochner, 2004, and Mocan, Billups and Overland, 2005). 
The model presented in this section incorporates this dynamic feature into the basic 
time allocation structure of Witte and Tauchen’s framework. The aim of this is to consider how 
crime-age profiles have scope to be shifted by changes in the mandatory dropout age. The 
starting point rests on the notion that an individual decides how to allocate time between the 
illegal sector, where they devote time to crime (), and the legal sector, working ( − ), where 
 is his/her full time endowment. However, given that time for crime is constrained whilst 
individuals are enrolled in school, the full time endowment  will be a function of age, (), 
most importantly being reduced if an individual is in school and aged below the minimum age 
of school dropout .  
Normalizing c and t to the unit interval, one example of how the time endowment differs 
by age and dropout age is:  
() = 
     <    ≥ 0 <  <  < 1 (1) 
where the l and h subscripts index low and high free time available to allocate to crime. In this 
example  < 1 so 1 -  may be thought of as leisure time. The key feature of the model is that 
the younger individuals may do some crime (as > 0) but because they are kept in school this 
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acts as an incapacitation effect preventing them from engaging in as much crime as those older 
than the dropout age who have more available time for such activity.  
The likelihood of these older individuals to do so depends on the relative returns to 
crime or work. The labour market returns to work are given by the wage, (), which is a 
function of potential labour market experience, defined as e = max {0,  − }, and which 
reflects on-the-job-training and learning-by-doing. Each individual faces a rate of return to 
crime () and a sanction () if they are caught doing crime. Given the probability of being 
caught by law enforcement () and a utility function (. ) each individual maximizes his/her 
expected utility by choosing the optimal amount of time to spend on crime  in the following 
maximization problem: 
max{ }  !1 − ()"!() + ()(() − )" + ()(() + ()(() − ) − ()) 
.    ≤ () 
(2) 
Operationalising the model requires the following assumptions: 
i) %(. ) ≥ 0, %′(. ) ≤ 0 – standard positive marginal utility and diminishing returns.
ii)  % ≥ 0 – the probability of getting caught increases with time devoted to crime.
iii) '% ≥ 0 – the sanction penalty increases as an individual approaches legal age and
surpasses the extended age of the juvenile state court. 
iv) (% ≥ 0 – returns to criminal time increase as the individual gains potential experience
and builds criminal capital.
v) (% ≥ 0, (%% ≤ 0 – there are concave wage profiles that are particularly prevalent in
young and low-educated workers.
vi) '% ≥ 0 - as the individual gets older and is therefore older than the dropout age, the
time endowment increases.
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If assumptions (i) to (vi) hold, and defining the relative return to crime over work as 
)() ≡ () − (), then the solution to the individual’s optimization problem in (2) is given 
by a level of  that satisfies the following first order condition: 
!1 − ()"%(()() + )()))() + ()%!()() + !)() − ()""!)() −
()" + %()+!()() + !)() − ()"" − (()() + )()), − - = 0  
-! − ()" = 0,  − () ≤ 0,  ≥ 0, - ≥ 0 
(3) 
In (3), if - ≠ 0 the constraint binds and  = () meaning the individual will use the 
full extent of his/her time endowment to engage in the illegal sector. On the other hand, if - =
0, so the constraint does not bind, then the unconstrained problem is returned to. The optimality 
condition equalizes the marginal net benefit of crime to the marginal benefit of working, as 
follows: 
!1 − ()"%(()() + )()))() + ()%!()() + !)() − ()""!)() −
()" + %()+!()() + !)() − ()"" − (()() + )()), = 0  
 − () < 0,  ≥ 0
(4) 
Understanding how the optimal amount of crime varies with age, and so generates a 
crime-age profile, and in particular how changes in school dropout age can affect this is the 
main goal of this paper. The implicit derivative of the optimal crime choice with respect to age 
8 
is given by  ∗'  = − 010' / 010  , where F stands for the first order condition defined by equation 
(4).5 
The following proposition emerges: 
Proposition 
If (i) individuals are risk averse, 3 =  − 45545 ≥ 0 , (ii) wealth is non-decreasing in age 
%()() + ()%() + !)%() − %()" ≥ 0, (iii) the net rate of return to crime is non-
negative )() ≥ 0, and decreasing in age, )%() ≤ 0, and (iv) Lemma 16,  then the slope of the 
crime age-profile will be decreasing in age   ∗'  ≤ 0.7 
Proof: See Appendix B.8 
The framework can be used to help understand some of the mechanisms behind the 
crime-age profiles that are observed in the data. The fact that optimal crime is decreasing in 
age matches the desistance stage (e.g. in the life course approach of Sampson and Laub, 1993, 
2005) that typically starts in the late teens or early twenties. The onset age, with an increasing 
crime-age profile, can be thought of in light of this framework as a case in which the net return 
5
 See Appendix B for the formal derivations. 
6
 See Appendix B. 
7
 The conditions stated are not exhaustive of all cases where  ∗' ≤ 0, however, they are the ones that are most in 
line with empirical evidence.
8 Individual risk aversion is a key feature of standard economic models, whilst the non-decreasing wealth as 
function of age (at least until retirement approaches) seems supported by existing empirical evidence, though for 
older individuals than considered here. The positive net rate of return to crime needs to hold if an individual is 
ever to engage their time in criminal activities - intuitively if the return was to be negative the individual would 
choose to engage all of his/her time in the legal sector. Perhaps the most challenging assumption is that of the net 
return to crime decreasing with age. We would argue that this is most plausibly the case for the later ages studied 
in this paper – where there are increasing sanctions due to the loss of juvenile and extended age status in court 
(Levitt, 1998) and no evidence of convex age returns to crime. 
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to crime is actually increasing in very early ages given the reduced level of sanctions commonly 
imposed on juveniles and relatively low legal wage opportunities. 
The key practical dimension of this simple model is the way it can be used to examine 
how the crime-age profile may change when the minimum dropout age is increased. In the 
model this first implies a strengthening of the age constraint at younger ages9 that will limit the 
allocation of available time to engage in criminal activities because of incapacitation.  Second, 
there is a medium-term effect at later ages as the return to crime will be lower due to less 
investment being made in a criminal career (even if we make the extreme assumption that 
education is non-productive). A higher dropout age implies entrance into the unconstrained 
optimal crime time allocation at an older age, in which the dominant role is played by the net 
return to crime. If the latter is decreasing in age, by the time the individual is free to allocate 
his/her time the return will now be lower than it would under a counterfactual lower dropout 
age as the individual concerned faces potential tougher sanctions and the loss of the criminal 
experience premium that would have otherwise been accumulated. 
Figure 2 shows a simulation of the model where the minimum dropout age is 
increased.10 It focusses on the age range 15-24, as will the empirical work discussed below, 
and considers a rise in the dropout age from 17 to 18. As previously described the effects of 
incapacitation (short-term) and criminal premium loss (medium-term) on time allocation are 
easily identified at the respective ages. These effects are congruent with the empirical crime-
age profile shown in Figure 1, with the simulated reform showing strong effects of 
incapacitation, followed by a permanent damping down of the crime-age profile at subsequent 
ages.  
9
 The magnitude of the effect of the higher dropout age will depend on its enforceability and on the extent of 
truancy.
10
 The calibration parameters of the model are provided in Appendix B. 
10 
Various statistical characterizations of the shift in the profile can be described. For 
example, in Figure 2 the mean offending age rises a little, going from 19.36 to 19.42, the mode 
from 17 to 18, and the median from 18.72 to 18.85. As we shall see, the empirical results 
presented later in the paper broadly match these moment changes, though one difference is that 
the incapacitation change is less pronounced in the data, whilst the longer-term benefits are 
stronger. Of course, the model is highly simplified so it should not be expected to perfectly 
reflect the empirical evidence – it is a tool for exposition that reveals theoretical mechanisms 
that may underpin shifts in crime age profiles induced by changes in the dropout age. 
3. Data Description and Empirical Approach
Arrest Data 
The crime data used in the analysis is provided by the FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR) 
which compiles yearly arrest data by age and sex at local police enforcement agency level. This 
is currently available from 1974 to 2015. As most crime is committed by men and at younger 
ages and the compulsory school laws also apply to these ages we choose to conduct our analysis 
on males aged 15 to 24 years old. For these ages, arrests are reported by single year of age. 
For the purpose of the analysis, the geographical level of aggregation is at the county 
level as in Anderson (2014). This may initially seem odd since the reforms we are focused on 
occur at the state-level and it would therefore seem natural to analyse the impact at that level 
of aggregation. The problem we face in doing that is the substantial non-reporting of arrests by 
individual agencies to the UCR. This non-reporting changes over time and across states. To 
generate annual state-level arrest data therefore requires some method of imputation.11 To give 
the most extreme example, consider the CSL reform in Illinois that became effective from 2006 
11
 One alternative approach is to only use the yearly observations on state-level arrest data when at least a 
minimum, say 95%, of the state population is reported on by the relevant agencies (see Bell, Bindler and Machin, 
2018). But this generates an unbalanced panel and is therefore not appropriate within our framework.  
11 
and increased the compulsory attendance age to 17. If we use a five-year window around the 
reform, only 1 of the 102 counties in Illinois consistently report arrest data every year – 
fortunately at least it is Chicago. 
In the context of our research question and methodology using any such imputation 
would be inappropriate. We are seeking to exploit the discontinuity between cohorts over a 
short window and this requires consistent data to be available both pre- and post-reform. We 
therefore aggregate all agencies within a county and only include the county in our analysis if 
all the agencies report for all relevant years (or at most miss one year) around the reform 
window. Table A1 of Appendix A presents more detail on the numbers of covered and missing 
counties for each reform, together with information on the percentage of the state population 
covered. Detailed county-level population numbers by sex, age and race are matched to arrest 
data and adjusted to the covering standards so as to produce precise age arrest rates and 
demographic composition controls.12  
Compulsory Schooling Laws 
We have updated the compulsory schooling laws used in Bell, Costa and Machin (2016). 
Over time in empirical research using CSLs, the choice of how to measure the binding 
compulsory school age has been open to scrutiny and some disagreement. For example, 
Stephens and Yang (2014) propose a refined version of the Goldin and Katz (2008) 
measurement combining start age, dropout age, grade requirement and child labour laws, 
whereas Oreopoulos (2009) and Anderson (2014) focus only on the dropout age enacted in the 
laws. We think it important to take account of grade exemptions as they often make up part of 
recent laws. Therefore, for a given birth cohort ( − ) where t denotes year and a is age, the 
measure of binding school age in state s is then given by: 
678,(9:') = ;<)=6> 7?8,9(9:'), @A BC><A  6>8,(9:')D (5) 
12
 Unfortunately, the UCR data does not include a racial breakdown of arrests, making it impossible to evaluate 
the effect of the policies along a racial dimension. 
12 
Figure 3 maps how changes in the dropout age enacted between 1980 and 2010 
occurred between different states in the US. The map makes clear that some regions - such as 
the West South Central (Arkansas, Texas and Louisiana) and West Pacific (California and 
Washington) - have been most active over this period in introducing legislative changes to 
compulsory school age. 
Defining the precise initial cohort that is affected by these changes in compulsory 
schooling laws is not always as mechanical as simply subtracting the new dropout age from 
the year the law was enacted. Some of the more recent laws studied in this paper contain a 
degree of complexity that is significantly higher than that were those enacted in the first three 
quarters of the twentieth century that have formed the focus of most previous research. In 
particular, some of the more recent law changes also feature employment exemptions, parental 
consents, mitigating circumstances and different effective dates. These all have some scope to 
add potential sources of measurement error to any attempt to formally code the laws. To reduce 
noise around the cohort apportionment, all the changes have therefore been cross-validated 
empirically by analysing the data around the potential discontinuity and adjusting as and when 
it is needed.  
Table 1 lists the 30 laws occurring between 1974 and 2010 that are studied in the 
empirical analysis, together with offering detail on various relevant features of them including 
the particular dropout age change and new dropout age, and whether they feature exemptions 
by school grade. Notice that some states have multiple dropout age reforms in the time window 
studied here, so there are twenty four states that implemented at least one education policy 
reform that altered the compulsory leaving age between 1974 and 2010. The multiple changes 
occur for five states (twice for Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, and three times for 
Texas). 
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Research Design 
We study crime evolution before and after changes in compulsory school leaving laws 
based on arrest rates by individual year of age a for men in county c located in state s in time 
period t. A baseline crime reduced form is as follows: 
7' 89 =  EB;8(9:') + FG' 89 +  H' +  H +  H9 +  I' 89 (6) 
where Arrest is the log arrest rate, Reform is a dummy variable (to begin with) indicating 
whether or not there was a dropout age reform affecting birth cohort ( − ) in state s, X is a 
set of county level controls and αa, αc and αt respectively are fixed effects for age, county (also 
subsuming state fixed effects) and time, and ε is the equation error term. 
When structured as in equation (6), this crime reduced form is essentially the one that 
has been estimated in much of the existing work examining the causal impact of schooling laws 
by pooling together data across states which did and did not change their schooling laws over 
time. This has been done for a number of outcomes of interest: for wages, see for example, 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) and Oreoupoulos (2009); for crime, see Lochner and Moretti 
(2004) and Bell, Costa and Machin (2016); and for a range of outcomes probing robustness of 
the approach in detail see Stephens and Yang (2014). 
We begin by presenting estimates this way for comparison, but then move on to treat 
each of the reforms listed in Table 1 as a separate regression discontinuity (RD) around which 
we can examine what happens to crime before and after the reform takes place. To motivate 
the RD analysis, Figure 4 shows the discontinuity for the arrest rate for the pooled reforms 
(centred at t = 0). It shows a significant reduction in the arrest rate of 4 arrests per 1000 
population (or 4.6 percent of the pre-reform mean of 0.086) relative to the earlier cohorts who 
were unaffected by the reform.  
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More formally, for a given school dropout reform in a particular state, the following 
specification for different time windows (w) around the dropout age policy changes can be 
estimated: 
7' 89 =  EB;8(9:')  +  ( − )   +  FG' 89  +  H' + H + H9 +  I' 89 
    ( − ) −  ≤  −  ≤ ( − ) + ,  = {5, 7, 10} (7) 
where the forcing variable in the classic RD design (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and 
Lemieux, 2010) is birth cohort ( − )  and the general function (. ) allows for various 
functional forms that can be adopted for estimation. 
To study the manner in which the policy change induces shifts in crime-age profiles, 
we further amend the RD design, allowing heterogeneity by age in the policy reform. This is 
precisely what the theoretical framework we described in Section 2 above argued needs to be 
done to see: a) how crime-age profiles may alter for different dropout ages; and b) to pin down 
the nature of incapacitation effects that occur when young people stay in school to later ages. 
In practice, we estimate separate before/after policy effects in the crime reduced form 
for each age fixed effect, so that a more general estimating equation follows: 
7' 89 =  L'(B;8(9:'))  +  ( − )   +  FG' 89  +  H' + H + H9 + I' 89 (8) 
M7' 89M7?' N  = O = [LQ × B;(−)]+ HQ
where the partial derivative shows the impact for age j (j = 15, 16….24) as a function of the 
reform. 
Controls 
We match in a set of control measures that according to existing evidence (e.g. Levitt, 
1997; Card and Krueger, 1992) may relate to both arrests and educational attainment and 
progress. Some of Card and Krueger’s (1992) school quality measures (pupil-teacher ratios, 
average teacher salary, number of schools) were updated at county-level using Common Core 
15 
Date (CCD) data.13 Police numbers were recovered from the FBI Law Enforcement Officers 
Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) database and socio-demographic indicators were collected 
from the Local Area Personal Income (LAPI) data from Bureau of Economic Analysis. More 
details on these are provided in the Data Appendix. 
4. Crime-Age Profiles and Dropout Age
Baseline Estimates of Crime Reduced Forms 
Although the primary focus of the paper is on the crime-age profile, the empirical 
analysis begins by estimating the effect of the dropout reforms on the overall arrest rate. This 
is both because an overall effect is a necessary condition for the reforms to also alter the shape 
of the profile – since it is hard to think how the reform could increase the crime rate for those 
affected at any point in the profile – and because the prior literature has focused on such 
reduced forms and so it is useful to demonstrate that the reforms considered in this paper, which 
are more recent, generate similar effects as those examined previously. 
Table 2 reports the baseline estimates of the crime reduced form. At this stage, all 
reforms across time and space are treated as equivalent and thus have a single indicator for 
reform. Later in this section separate estimates for each type of reform are presented (e.g. an 
increase in the school-leaving age from 16 to 17, 16 to 18, 17 to 18 etc.). It turns out that the 
results are robust to allowing each type of reform to have separate estimates and it is therefore 
more straightforward to start with to present estimates for the weighted-average effect of all 
types of reforms, which is what Table 2 does. All standard errors are clustered at the state-
cohort level, which is the dimension along which each reform occurs. 
Implicit in the discussion thus far has been the assumption that each reform can be 
considered as exogenous to the parameters of interest. Crucially, we assume that school-leaving 
13
 Further details are given in Appendix A. 
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reforms where not instigated at a particular time and in a particular state in response to crime 
concerns related to the precise cohorts that would be affected by the reform. This seems 
unlikely to us because crime outcomes are generally viewed as an unintended consequence of 
school leaving age reforms. However, one way of assessing this is to consider balancing tests 
that compare observables between cohorts on either side of the discontinuity that the reform 
creates. Such tests are presented in Appendix Table A2 and there is no evidence to suggest any 
pattern around the discontinuity. 
The first column in Table 2 presents estimates that simply turn on a reform dummy for 
particular cohorts in particular states using the dating provided in Table 1. This is therefore 
equivalent to the typical type of estimates that are presented in the reduced-form economics of 
crime literature such as Lochner and Moretti (2004) and given as equation (6) above. They do 
not explicitly take advantage of the discontinuity that each reform generates. The impact of the 
reform is significantly negative at the 1% level, and as such shows a strong crime reducing 
effect from higher dropout ages.14  
The preferred estimates are those in the subsequent columns of the Table that are 
equivalent to equation (7) above and exploit the discontinuity across cohorts. They include a 
full set of state interactions with all the control variables and estimates are presented for 
different parametric forms for the running variable and for the length of the window around 
which we estimate the discontinuity. The first three estimates use a 10-year window around 
each discontinuity and each allows the running variable to have different parametric form on 
either side of the reform. It matters little what the functional form for the running variable is, 
so we proceed from now on with using a simple linear function.15  
14
 We have also estimated column (1) allowing for quadratic or cubic terms in the running variable and these 
produce coefficients very similar to the -0.099 reported in column (1): to be precise -0.086 and -0.091 respectively. 
15
 All subsequent results are robust to using a quadratic or cubic function for the running variable, though such 
forms are computational feasible only for the longer windows around the discontinuity. 
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The discontinuity estimates are roughly half the size of the estimates presented in 
column (1), but remain strongly significant. In the final two columns we experiment with a 
narrower window around the discontinuity. Again, there is not much to choose between these 
various specifications, so we proceed with a 5-year window on the basis that this more tightly 
focuses on the discontinuity.16 This final estimate suggests a 6% fall in arrest rates for these 
young adults as a result of the dropout reform. 
Different Types of Reform 
The estimates presented in Table 2 pooled all the reform types together to estimate an 
average effect across the 30 reforms studied. In Table 3 estimates are reported separately for 
the 5 year window specifications for the five different reform types: the 29 reforms that featured 
an increase, either from 16 to 17, 17 to 18, 16 to 18, or any other increase; and the one reform 
in Texas in 1985 where the rewriting of the law lowered the dropout age from 17 to 16. 
Column (1) begins by reporting an estimate for the weighted-average of the 29 reform 
types that involved an age increase. The estimated reduction in the Log(Arrest Rate) is -0.062 
which, of course, is very similar to the column (6) specification of Table 2 of -0.060, although 
is slightly more negative. In column (2), the Texas increase attracts a significant positive 
coefficient of 0.090. That the effect is positive in the case of a dropout age reduction offers a 
useful robustness test in line with crime reducing impacts of dropout age increases (and the 
opposite for this single case of lower dropout age) for the analysis.  
16 The results in Table 2 follow the standard approach in the RDD literature of assuming that the reform is 
exogenous. We presented balancing tests on observables in Table A2 that are supportive of this assumption, but 
we recognise that this is a far from exhaustive list of observables and in any case one can never prove that all 
unobservables are balanced. A key concern may be that states decided to implement a reform at exactly the time 
it might have the most beneficial effect on crime. To examine this further we adopt a synthetic control approach 
and essentially combine the RDD design with a diff-in-diff approach. For each reform, we consider all other states 
as potential controls and use a five-year window prior to the reform to generate a synthetic control. Consider for 
example the reform in California that raised the leaving age in 1987. We use the average arrest rate for 15-24 year 
olds from 1982-1986 and match on arrest rate, percent black, percent young, personal income per head, 
employment-population rate and police officers per head. This then generates a set of weights for all other states 
that best matches the California arrest rate for 15-24 year olds in the pre-reform period. If we re-estimate the final 
column of Table 2 using this approach we obtain a coefficient estimate (and associated standard error) on the 
reform of -0.040 (0.007). 
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Estimates for the four different groups of dropout age increases are presented in 
columns (3) through (6) of Table 3. There were respectively 8 reforms raising the dropout age 
from 16-17, 6 from 17 to 18, 8 from 16 to 18 and 8 in the catch-all ‘Other’ group.17 In all four 
groups, there is a significant crime reduction effect, and the estimates are in a quite tight range 
between -0.041 and -0.071. 
The use of county-level panel data means it is also possible to estimate the discontinuity 
for each reform separately. Estimates produced from doing this are presented in Table A3, but 
it is easier to visualise the various estimates as they are presented in Figure 5. Each point 
represents a separate reform labelled along the horizontal axis, and 95% confidence bands for 
each estimate are shown. Only one of the 30 reforms generates a significantly positive effect 
on arrest rates – the 1985 Texas reform. Of the other 29 reforms, 16 are significantly negative, 
and all but 4 have a negative estimate.  
Different Crime Types 
Table 4 present estimates for the 29 pooled reforms involving age increases that 
distinguish between different crime types (total, violent, property and drug arrests).18 It also 
presents estimates that differ by two broad age groups (15-18 and 19-24). This second set of 
estimates offers a first indication as to whether the crime-age profile is altered by the reforms. 
The results of the Table suggest a fairly consistent pattern across crime types, though the effect 
is larger in magnitude (in absolute terms) for drug arrests than the other types of crime. 
Focusing on the age groups, in all cases the effect is larger for those contemporaneously 
affected by the reforms (i.e. in the younger 15-18 age range) than for those who were affected 
17
 The reforms in the ‘Other’ group are listed in the notes to Table 3. 
18
 For the remainder of the empirical analysis, the focus is placed only upon the 29 dropout age increases, 
excluding the Texas increase. Results are however robust to including the increase. 
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in the past. However this latter group still experiences a significantly lower arrest rate as a 
result of the reform that they were subject to when at school.19 
The Impact on Crime-Age Profiles 
Having demonstrated the crime-reducing effect of the reforms overall, and first 
identified some variation by broad age group, the focus is now directly placed on the effect on 
the entire crime-age profile, with an aim of studying the extent to which its shape may change 
in response to the education reforms. To begin, the specification for the 5 year window is 
generalised to have different reform effects at each single age – corresponding to equation (8) 
above. This then allows examination of the key question of the paper – can policy reforms alter 
the entire shape of the crime-age profile?  
Consistent with the theoretical simulation presented in section 2, the results reported in 
Table 5 show that reforms have the largest effect for those directly incapacitated as a result of 
school attendance. However, they also show a significantly negative effect for later age groups 
that are not incapacitated in school as a result of the reform. These two findings emerge to 
varying degrees for different crime types. 
Figure 6 shows the estimates, with 95% confidence bands, for each crime type. To 
highlight the effect on the crime-age profile overall, Figure 7 shows the estimated profiles pre- 
and post-reform by crime type. It is clear how the reforms are reducing crime at all stages of 
the life-cycle, though generally more heavily in the early years. Thus there is evidence of both 
a temporary incapacitation effect – when the young people are locked up in school – and a 
longer term crime reducing effect. 
Closer inspection of Figure 7 does reveal some differences in the balance between 
crime reductions at younger and older ages across crime types. When pooled, the total crime 
19
 For the total arrests specification in column (1) of the Table, the null hypothesis that the two age groups have 
the same arrest response to the reform can be rejected, with a p-value of 0.004. 
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figure shows larger incapacitation effects.  The same is true for property and drug crimes, and 
in the case of the former there is little in the way of an effect at older post-incapacitation ages. 
For violent crimes, the opposite holds:  little in the way of incapacitation, but some crime 
reduction at older ages. 
As we noted in the discussion of the theoretical model that in part motivates the 
empirical work, we can also look at how reforms affect various moments of the crime-age 
profile. Table A4 in the Appendix presents estimates for total crime and for the three sub-
categories. All the moments are significantly shifted by the reform. The measures of central 
tendency (mean, mode) are shifted to the right as predicted and the standard deviation falls - 
thus the crime-age profile becomes more compressed after the dropout age is raised.  
5. Mechanisms and Discussion
The reported results considered so far show a strong negative effect on arrest rates from 
school leaving age reforms. This operates both at the time an individual’s behaviour is directly 
impacted by the policy, and also in subsequent years when they are not. The former effect is 
likely to be a result of incapacitation – a young person is constrained to remain in school, so 
they have less free time to allocate to crime. In this section, some potential mechanisms that 
may explain the latter longer run effect are considered.  
Education and Employment Outcomes 
There is by now a large literature that examines the causal effect of education on 
crime.20 A natural interpretation of the dropout reform reducing criminality is that, in addition 
to the direct incapacitation effect that occurs from requiring students to remain in school for an 
additional year, the additional year also generates a productive educational benefit for those on 
the margin of criminal behaviour. This then raises their human capital, wages and employment 
20
 Many of these studies were cited earlier, but see also the review in Lochner (2011). 
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and reduces the probability of committing crime in the future. This is consistent with the 
theoretical model outlined in Section 2, and with the earlier US research studying the impact 
of the earlier compulsory school leaving reforms from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.21 
To assess this explanation of the results, the empirical connection between the reforms 
and different measures of education and work are considered. First of all, looking at the 
incapacitation side of things, we explore whether school attendance did in fact increase by 
utilising Current Population Survey (CPS) data on 16-18 year olds between 1974 and 2015 (see 
the Data Appendix for more details). Panel A of Table 6 shows the estimates, structured in the 
same way as the earlier baseline results for arrests. There is significant evidence of 
incapacitation, with the 5-year window specification in column (4) showing a 5 percentage 
point rise, or a 6.6 percent increase relative to the pre-reform mean. This reaffirms that school 
incapacitation effects were a key dimension of the dropout age reforms. 
To explore what might lie behind the longer run crime reducing effects, the remainder 
of the Table reports results for education and job related outcomes for older individuals aged 
19-60 in the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2006 onwards.22 The outcomes are 
high-school dropout rates, whether or not an individual was in education or work, and log 
weekly real wages. Whilst there are statistically significant effects in the expected direction for 
a number of the specifications, the estimates are relatively small in magnitude. They do uncover 
education improvements that followed from dropout age reform, and an increased likelihood 
of being in school or work, but the effects are small – relative to the pre-reform mean, they 
respectively correspond to a 5.3 percent fall in high school dropout and a 0.4 percent increase 
in the likelihood of being in education or work. Unlike in the previous work on earlier reforms 
21
 For crime, see Lochner and Moretti (2004). For reviews of the sizable bodies of research on wage effects see 
Card (1999) and Oreoupoulos (2009). For a host of other non-wage outcomes variables – including health, voting 
behaviour and life satisfaction - see Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011). 
22
 ACS data is used because it is annual data that can be used to study the reforms across pooled birth cohorts. See 
the Data Appendix for more detail. 
22 
(e.g. Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Card, 1999), there is essentially no effect on wages in any 
specification.23 
Interpretation 
The positive effects of the reforms on economic and education outcomes are therefore 
modest, certainly in comparison to Lochner and Moretti (2004) who find education estimates 
that are quite a lot bigger than those reported in Table 6. However, our previous work (Bell, 
Costa and Machin, 2016) has demonstrated that the most recent reforms to compulsory 
schooling laws have substantially weaker effects on educational attainment than estimates 
identified using changes from dropout age reforms in the 1950s and 1960s. This is in line with 
the notion that the group of compliers – e.g. those that obtain a high-school diploma when the 
reform occurs who would not have done previously – are a smaller percentage of the eligible 
population for the period studied in this paper. 
This interpretation makes sense as the high school dropout rate for those aged 16-24 
fell from 27.2 percent in 1960 in Lochner and Moretti’s data to 5.9 percent in 2015. This shrinks 
the group of potential compliers by a lot and makes it more likely that the dropouts are a hard 
core of individuals for whom such reforms are unlikely to have any effect (i.e. a higher share 
of never takers). This does not mean that there is no effect – after all a 0.5% percentage point 
(5.3 percent) fall in the dropout rate will certainly affect the criminal margin for some 
individuals. But it seems unlikely that the size of this change in educational attainment can 
explain the entire 3-4 percent reduction in arrest rates that we observe for 19-24 year olds. 
If the reforms do not substantively boost educational attainment or wages, what other 
mechanisms can explain the lower crime rate further along the age distribution when direct 
incapacitation effects cannot be operative? One possibility is dynamic incapacitation. This is 
23
 Lack of a wage effect from dropout age reforms is not unique to this paper. Pischke and Von Wachter (2008), 
for example, report no wage gains from German compulsory school leaving age reforms. 
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where the direct incapacitation from being kept in the school classroom causes changes that 
affect future crime participation, independent of whether there is any educational value to the 
incapacitation. For example, suppose that being kept in school during the day prevents an 
individual from being on a street corner dealing drugs. This reduces arrests at the time, but also 
potentially means that the individual leaves school without the criminal record they would 
otherwise have had. They now find it easier to pursue a life as a law-abiding citizen. Put another 
way, some individuals’ crime onset is stopped by incapacitation and they never commit crime 
subsequently. For other individuals who may already have committed crime, the incapacitation 
reduces their crime intensity in the incapacitation period and this persists as they get older – 
the reform acts to reduce their criminal capital accumulation as compared to the counterfactual 
of no reform. 
Other evidence also suggests that interventions at this crucial period of potential 
criminal development can alter the life course of criminality. Bell, Bindler and Machin (2018), 
for example, show that leaving high school in a recession can significantly increase the affected 
cohorts’ arrest rates well into adult life – in a sense the recession generates crime scars that 
persist beyond the period of direct impact. In a different setting, looking at random assignment 
of judges in Chicago to identify the causal effects of juvenile incarceration, Aizer and Doyle 
(2015) show that incarceration both reduces the probability of high-school graduation and 
increases the likelihood of subsequent incarceration as an adult. Both these studies are 
consistent with finding of dynamic incapacitation effects.  
Evidence Based on Individual Panel Data 
To further explore these effects, we also analysed a different education reform enacted 
in Queensland, Australia. The reason for presenting this evidence in addition to the US 
evidence is twofold. First of all, it shows very similar effects in a different setting. Second, the 
Queensland data has one clear advantage over the US cohort data as it follows the same 
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individuals through time. Its disadvantage is that we can study only a single reform, rather than 
the multiple reforms studied in depth earlier in this paper. 
In 2006 Queensland implemented an “Earning or Learning” reform that required all 
individuals aged 16 and 17 who previously could have left compulsory education at age 15 to 
participate in some form of education, training or work. The reform’s impact on individual 
offending behaviour has been studied in depth by Beatton, Kidd, Machin and Sarkar (2018), 
but it is interesting in the context of the current paper to use their longitudinal data on all state 
school children matched to crime records when at school and up to age 23 after they have left 
school to further probe static and dynamic incapacitation effects. 24  The data on criminal 
behaviour refers to alleged criminal offences – either being arrested, cautioned or having a 
warrant for apprehension issued – and is therefore similar to the US arrest data. 
To begin with, we examined the overall impact of the education reform on criminal 
behaviour, again exploiting the discontinuity between different cohorts. The first column of 
Table 7 shows that the overall effect is an 11% (coefficient of -0.006 on a pre-reform mean of 
0.055) reduction in the treated cohorts’ offending rate. This is somewhat larger than the average 
estimates for the US presented earlier – though not out of line with some of the more sizable 
individual state estimates. The next two columns of Table 7 shows that those affected by the 
reform are 13% less likely to offend whilst incapacitated as a result of the reform (age 15-17) 
and 10% less likely to offend in the post-incapacitation period (age 18-23). So we see a 
somewhat larger reduction in offending during the incapacitation period, as with the US results. 
In Figure 8 we present the crime-age profile shifts for the Australian case. Much like its US 
counterpart (Figure 7), we observe lower offending rates throughout the crime-age profiles for 
the different types of crime, again with larger effects occurring during the incapacitation period. 
24
 More detail on the Earning and Learning reform and on the data are given in the Data Appendix (sections A9 
and A10). 
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The longitudinal dimension of the Queensland data permits a more in-depth analysis of 
the dynamics of criminal behaviour following the education reform. In particular, we can study 
multiple offending behaviour for the same individuals over time and, in doing so, explore the 
extensive (whether individuals ever offend) and intensive (how much offending individuals do 
conditional upon being an offender) margins of crime. We start by exploring the impact of the 
reform on the extensive margin by looking at the individual’s probability of ever being accused 
of committing a crime. Column (4) of Table 7 shows that the reform reduces this lifetime (at 
least up to age 23) probability by 18%. In other words, a key dimension along which these 
educational reforms change crime is by removing a set of individuals from the pool who ever 
commit a crime.  
In columns (5) and (6) we return to consider the question of dynamic incapacitation, 
now using the longitudinal aspects of the data. We explore the change in the probability of 
offending for those aged 18-23, conditional on whether or not they have been accused of a 
crime when at school. There is a very substantial 24% decline in this probability for those who 
had no school-aged prior offence. We argue that this is the dynamic incapacitation effect at 
work – they have avoided trouble during their school age years and this then keeps them on the 
right track later in life.  
In column (6) we see that for those who did not avoid being in trouble at a younger age, 
the reforms have less effect at older ages – the probability of reoffending after leaving 
education falls by 6.6%. So the key dimension of these reforms is to significantly reduce the 
number of individuals who are ever accused of committing a crime – and much of this reduction 
occurs among ages that are not directly incapacitated by the reforms. 
In columns (7) and (8) we look at the intensive margin (as measured by number of total 
crimes accused of) for the same two sub-populations examined in columns (5) and (6). For 
both groups we see a reduction in the number of offences, suggesting that the reforms reduce 
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the accumulation of criminal capital that enhances the productivity of criminals. Interestingly 
however the declines are broadly similar for the two groups (relative to their pre-reform means). 
Shifts in the age of offending onset for individuals who are treated and not treated by 
the education reform are shown from survivor function estimates in Figure 9. It shows a 
sizeable decrease in the probability of offending conditional on no prior offending across ages, 
with a lowering of magnitude for later ages. The estimates converge by age 23 – this should 
not be surprising since at that age the probability of being accused of an offence having never 
previously been accused of one by the age of 22 is extremely low. It would be odd if the reform 
affected marginal conditional probabilities so far away. But it is important to remember that 
this is not to say that the reform does not reduce the probability that an individual will have 
been accused of an offence by age 23 – our results show it certainly does. 
Cost-Benefit Calculation 
In Table 8 we report back of the envelope cost-benefit calculations for the US 
educational reforms studied in this paper. Based on our earlier results we calculate the 
estimated foregone costs of crime as benefits using the same methodology as Lochner and 
Moretti (2004), and we additionally incorporate the costs of keeping students in high school 
for the additional school years. As reported by the cost-benefit ratio we find that by age 18 the 
policy almost breaks even, with 0.94 dollars being recovered for every dollar spent. This result 
is representative of the economic return to the incapacitation effect estimated in our analysis. 
Perhaps more interestingly, we conclude that by taking into account the effects of dynamic 
incapacitation for older ages (until age 24) the cost-benefit ratio shows a return of almost 2 
(1.9) dollars per dollar spent on the policy. Whilst these estimates are only suggestive, they 
highlight how important the longer term effects of the policy are to an evaluation of the cost 
effectiveness of such reforms, in an environment in which there appear to be scant productivity-
enhancing effects from the reforms. 
27 
6. Conclusions
By developing a more general way of modelling the impact of school dropout age 
reforms on crime, this paper presents the first evidence to show that compulsory schooling law 
reforms not only affect the overall level of crime, but they also re-shape crime-age profiles. 
This enables a better understanding of the reasons why education causally reduces crime, 
guided by the empirical observation that there is heterogeneity connected to age in the way in 
which CSLs reduce crime. 
Focusing on changes in laws across US states since the 1980s, a multiple regression 
discontinuity framework is used to show that arrest rates for young men fall by around 6% on 
average as a result of these reforms. Whilst there is a larger negative effect for those in the age 
group that are directly constrained by the reforms – they are kept in school and incapacitated, 
hence having less time to devote to potential criminal activity – there is also a significant 
negative effect for those who are no longer directly constrained. The results are consistent with 
there being both an incapacitation effect and a longer-term beneficial crime reducing effect.  
This longer run effect is interpreted as a dynamic incapacitation effect because further 
evidence we present shows that these same reforms at best had very modest effects on average 
educational attainment and wages, though somewhat more substantial effects on high-school 
dropout. These results are further corroborated by including a study of the intensive and 
extensive margins of age-related crime reductions due to similar education reforms exploiting 
longitudinal data on youths in Queensland, Australia. The key finding emerging from analysis 
of these data is that dropout age reforms both reduce the probability of offending whilst 
incapacitated in school but also very substantially reduce the probability that these individuals 
begin to offend after they leave school. The overall implication is that school dropout age 
reforms can have longer run crime reducing effects from incapacitation than those occurring 
just in the incapacitation period itself. This is important both from the perspective of calculating 
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the social benefits that crime reduction due to CSLs generates and for generating a better 
understanding of how individual crime dynamics evolve over the life course.  
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Figure 1: Male Offender Rates by Age, US 
Notes: Male arrest rates by age, calculated for years 2000-2010 from UCR data. Only agencies reporting all 
years of the time period covered are included. The composition of the different type of crime is covered in the 
Data Appendix. 
.
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Figure 2: Model Simulation 
Notes: Details on the model simulation are presented in Appendix B. The ages 15 to 24 are those covered in 
the empirical analysis and the fraction of time devoted to crime is rescaled by a constant factor to (broadly) 
approximate the arrest rates observed in the data.
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Figure 3: State Dropout Ages, 1980 and 2010 
1980 
2010 
14
16
17
18
14
15
16
17
18
No data
Notes: Dropout Age is calculated using the formula Dropout Agest = min{Minimum Leaving Agest , Grade Exemptionst } 
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Figure 4: Arrest Rates Before/After Reforms 
Notes: The reported discontinuity estimate (with associated standard error in parentheses) is the +/- 5 year 
mean difference pre and post-reform for the outcome variables.
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Figure 5: Estimated Discontinuity Coefficients 
Notes: Coefficients from Table A4. 95% confidence intervals are shown. 
38 
Figure 6: Discontinuity Estimates by Age and Crime Type 
Notes: From estimates in Table 5. Texas (1985) is excluded from the estimation given that is a decrease in dropout age. Confidence intervals at 95% significance, 
standard errors clustered at reform-cohort level.
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Figure 7: Crime-Age Profile Shifts by Crime Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Prior arrest rate is the mean of arrest rate by age prior to discontinuity using a 5-year bandwidth. Post arrest rate is the calculated by estimated age effects of Figure 6. 
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Figure 8: Crime-Age Profile Shifts by Crime Type, Queensland - Australia 
Notes: Prior offending rate is the mean of offending rate by age prior to discontinuity using a 3-year bandwidth. Post offending rate is the calculated by estimated age effects calculated in 
using the same model of Figure 7 applied to Queensland – Australia individual panel data.
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Figure 9: Hazard Function from Duration Model, Queensland - Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The hazard functions are calculated based on the predicted values of a discrete time duration model assuming a log-
logistic density with specification including age and year fixed effects and a full interaction set age*treatment. 
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Table 1: State Dropout Age Reforms 
State Effective School Year From Statute Type Change New Dropout Age 
Arizona 1985 and 1986 Exemption 8th to 10th grade 16 
Arkansas 1981 Leaving Age 16 to 17 17 
Arkansas 1991 Leaving Age 17 to 18 18 
California 1987 Leaving Age 16 to 18 18 
Colorado 2008 Leaving Age 16 to 17 17 
Connecticut 2002 Leaving Age 16 to 18 18 
Illinois 2006 Leaving Age 16 to 18 17 
Indiana 1989 Leaving Age 16 to 17 17 
Indiana 1992 Leaving Age 17 to 18 18 
Iowa 1992 Exemption 8th to 12th grade 16 
Kentucky 1984 Leaving Age 17 to 18 18 
Louisiana 1988 Leaving Age 16 to 17 17 
Louisiana 2002 Leaving Age 17 to 18 18 
Maine 1981 Exemption 9th to 12th grade 17 
Michigan 1997 Exemption NA to 12th grade 16 
Michigan 2010 Leaving Age 16 to 18 18 
Mississippi 1984 Leaving Age Reenactment 17 
Missouri 2009 Leaving Age 16 to 17 17 
Nebraska 2005 Leaving Age 16 to 18 18 
Nevada 2008 Leaving Age 17 to 18 18 
New Hampshire 2010 Leaving Age 16 to 18 18 
New Mexico 1981 Exemption 10th to 12th grade 18 
Rhode Island 2003 Exemption NA to 12th grade 16 
South Dakota 2010 Leaving Age 16 to 18 18 
Texas 1985 Leaving Age Rewriting of law 16  
Texas 1990 Leaving Age 16 to 17 17 
Texas 1998 Leaving Age 17 to 18 18 
Virginia 1991 Leaving Age 17 to 18 18 
Washington 1996 Exemption 9th to 12th grade 18 
Wyoming 1999 Exemption 8th to 10th grade 16 
Notes: Mississippi abolished its compulsory school law in 1956, and reenacted it 1983/84 with an initial leaving age of 7 with progressive raise until 17 by the 
school year 1989/90. Texas has written its laws of 1984 and 1989 in a different way, stating the minimum leaving age was to include the completion of school 
year in which the birthday occurred in effect decreasing/increasing the leaving age by some months. Two other reforms occurred during the same period – in 
South Carolina (1987) and Kansas (1996). Missing arrests data precludes them from this study. 
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Table 2:  Baseline Estimates of Crime Reduced Forms 
Log(Arrest Rate), 1974 to 2015 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All States 10-Year Window 10-Year Window 10-Year Window 7-Year Window 5-Year Window 
Reform -0.099 
(0.018) 
-0.047 
(0.007) 
-0.065 
(0.009) 
-0.038 
(0.008) 
-0.062 
(0.007) 
-0.060 
(0.006) 
Running Variable Linear*Reform Quadratic*Reform Cubic*Reform Linear*Reform Linear*Reform 
Reform Interactions X X X X X 
Sample Size 
Number of States 
Number of Counties 
1,121,590 
48 
3,063 
344,940 
24 
1,277 
344,940 
24 
1,277 
344,940 
24 
1,277 
246,526 
24 
1,277 
178,005 
24 
1,277 
Notes: Sample includes males in each age group 15-24 inclusive for US counties. Estimates are weighted by population size and standard 
errors are clustered at state-cohort level (reform-cohort level for discontinuity windows). The dependent variable is the log of total arrest rate 
including violent, property and drug crimes. All specifications include age, year and county fixed effects. Covariates further include log of 
population, log of police force sworn and shares of female, black, non-white/non-black population. Reform Interactions means every covariate 
is made state-reform specific by adding an interaction with the state-reform indicator. Columns (2) to (6) include a centered running variable 
interacted with the dropout reform indicator as to allow differential trends at each side of the discontinuities. 
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Table 3: Estimates by Reform Type 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Log(Arrest Rate), 1974 to 2015, 
Discontinuity (+/- 5 years) Sample 
 
  
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
  
All Age 
Increase 
Reforms 
 
 
17 to 16, 
Texas 
 
16 to 17 
 
17 to 18 
 
16 to 18 
 
Other 
       
Reform -0.062 
(0.006) 
0.090 
(0.015) 
-0.071 
(0.015) 
-0.068 
(0.013) 
-0.060 
(0.011) 
-0.041 
(0.007) 
       
Sample Size 156,517 21,488 47,943 46,984 34,209 27,381 
Number of States 24 1 7 6 8 8 
Number of Counties 1,242 222 
 
533 487 374 282 
Notes: As for Table 2. Same specification as column (6) of Table 2. Each column shows separate regression according to the relevant 
reform sample. “Other” include the following reforms: Arizona (1985), Iowa (1992), Maine (1981), Michigan (1997), Mississippi 
(1984), Rhode Island (2003), Washington (1996) and Wyoming (1999). 
45 
Table 4:  Estimates by Crime Type and Age 
Log(Arrest Rate), 1974 to 2015, 
Discontinuity (+/- 5 years) Sample, 
All Age Increase Reforms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Violent Property Drugs 
A. Overall Reform Effect 
Reform -0.062 
(0.006) 
-0.056 
(0.008) 
-0.053 
(0.007) 
-0.099 
(0.010) 
B. Reform Effects By Broad Age Groups 
Reform*Age 15-18 -0.064 
(0.005) 
-0.059 
(0.008) 
-0.053 
(0.010) 
-0.128 
(0.013) 
Reform*Age 19-24 -0.041 
(0.005) 
-0.046 
(0.008) 
-0.043 
(0.008) 
-0.042 
(0.009) 
Sample Size 
Number of States 
Number of Counties 
156,517 
24 
1,242 
156,517 
24 
1,242 
156,517 
24 
1,242 
156,517 
24 
1,242 
Notes: As for Table 2. Same specification as column (6) of Table 2. Sample excludes Texas (1985) reform given that is a decrease in compulsory schooling.
46 
Table 5: Age Varying Reform Impacts 
Log(Arrest Rate), 1974 to 2015, 
Discontinuity (+/- 5 years) Sample, 
All Age Increase Reforms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Violent Property Drugs 
Reform*Age = 15 -0.102 
(0.010) 
-0.059 
(0.014) 
-0.078 
(0.011) 
-0.221 
(0.024) 
Reform*Age = 16 -0.097 
(0.009) 
-0.043 
(0.013) 
-0.075 
(0.010) 
-0.190 
(0.020) 
Reform*Age = 17 -0.050 
(0.010) 
-0.049 
(0.013) 
-0.035 
(0.012) 
-0.123 
(0.016) 
Reform*Age = 18 -0.034 
(0.007) 
-0.076 
(0.011) 
-0.023 
(0.009) 
-0.023 
(0.013) 
Reform*Age = 19 -0.046 
(0.007) 
-0.092 
(0.013) 
-0.032 
(0.009) 
-0.041 
(0.013) 
Reform*Age = 20 -0.057 
(0.008) 
-0.095 
(0.012) 
-0.052 
(0.009) 
-0.057 
(0.013) 
Reform*Age = 21 -0.059 
(0.008) 
-0.061 
(0.010) 
-0.063 
(0.011) 
-0.072 
(0.015) 
Reform*Age = 22 -0.048 
(0.010) 
-0.033 
(0.013) 
-0.051 
(0.012) 
-0.074 
(0.016) 
Reform*Age = 23 -0.054 
(0.011) 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.053 
(0.015) 
-0.068 
(0.017) 
Reform*Age = 24 -0.049 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
-0.061 
(0.018) 
-0.060 
(0.016) 
Sample Size 156,517 156,517 156,517 156,517 
Number of States 24 24 24 24 
Number of Counties 1,242 1,242 1,242 1,242 
Notes: As for Table 2. Same specification as column (6) of Table 2. Sample excludes Texas (1985) 
reform given that is a decrease in compulsory schooling.
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Table 6: Estimates for High School Attendance, Education, Employment and Wages 
 
  
    
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
 
Pre-Reform Mean 
 
All States 
 
10-Year Window 
 
7-Year Window 
 
5-Year Window 
 
       
A. High School Attendance (16-18)       
Reform 0.747 0.010 
(0.003) 
0.039 
(0.005) 
0.040 
(0.006) 
0.050 
(0.006) 
 
     
B. High School Dropout      
Reform 0.109 -0.007 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.001) 
-0.005 
(0.001) 
-0.006 
(0.001) 
 
     
C. School or Work      
Reform 
 
 
0.818 0.009 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
D. Log Weekly Real Wages      
Reform 
 
 
6.576 0.010 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
Running Variable 
 
  Linear*Reform Linear*Reform Linear*Reform 
Reform Interactions   X X X 
      
Sample Size (Panel A)  1,026,804 254,257 181,689 131,001 
Sample Size (Panels B and C)  6,816,430 1,716,601 1,201,659 861,019 
Sample Size (Panel D)  4,854,245 1,272,952 893,008 640,527 
Number of States (Panel A)  41 17 17 17 
Number of States (Panels B to D)  48 24 24 24 
Notes: CPS Basic Monthly (Panel A) sample includes all males, ages 16 to 18, from 1976-2015. Attendance in A is defined as an individual reporting to attend 
school full-time with education attainment lower than some college (See Appendix A).Panels B to D includes US born males in each age group 19-60 inclusive 
from 2006-2015 American Community Survey (ACS). Estimates are weighted by population weights and standard errors are clustered at state-cohort level. The 
dependent variables are: years of schooling, an indicator for high school dropout, an indicator for currently employed or attending school individuals (work or 
school) and log of real weekly wages. All specifications include age, year, black, hispanic and state of birth fixed effects (month fixed effects are added to row 
A). Reform Interactions means every covariate is made state-reform specific by adding an interaction with the state-reform indicator. 
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Table 7: Reform Effects on Intensive and Extensive Margins of Crime, Queensland – Australia 
 
 
 
  
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
  
Offending 
at 15-23 
 
Offending 
at 15-17 
 
Offending 
at 18-23 
 
Ever Offending 
at 15-23 
 
Offending at 18-
23 | No Prior 
Offense at 15-17 
 
 
Offending  at 18-
23 | Prior 
Offense at 15-17 
 
Number Offenses  
at 18-23 | No Prior  
Offense at 15-17 
 
 
Number Offenses  
at 18-23 | Prior  
Offense at 15-17 
 
Margin 
    
Extensive 
(Ever Offending) 
 
Extensive 
(First Offending) 
 
Extensive 
(Reoffending) 
 
Intensive 
(First Offending) 
 
Intensive 
(Reoffending) 
         
         
Effect at Relevant Age -0.006 
(0.001) 
-0.008 
(0.002) 
-0.005 
(0.001) 
-0.043 
(0.002) 
-0.030 
(0.002) 
-0.038 
(0.008) 
-0.260 
(0.065) 
-0.757 
(0.246) 
      
 
  
         
         
Sample Size 1,251,478 433,309 818,169 151,197 134,456 16,741 14,755 9,249 
Number of Individuals 151,197 151,197 151,197 151,197 134,456 16,741 14,755 9,249 
Pre-Reform Mean of  
Dependent Variable 
 
0.055 0.060 0.052 0.233 0.127 0.573 2.873 6.936 
Notes: Sample includes 2002 to 2013, males, ages 15-23. Only observations with balanced observations conditional on the cohort-year frame are included within a -/+ 3 year cohort window. Every 
specification includes year and age fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at individual level. 
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Table 8: Cost-Benefit Analysis 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Victim costs 
per crime 
Property loss 
per crime 
Incarceration 
costs per 
crime 
Total costs 
per crime 
Estimated 
change in 
arrests 
Estimated 
change in 
crimes 
Estimated 
change in 
incarcerations 
Benefits 
(6)*(4) 
Estimated 
change in 
school 
enrollment 
Costs 
(9)*$3,910 
Benefit/Cost 
Ratio 
(8)/(10) 
Ages 15-18 
A. Violent Crimes 33,406 135 7,399 40,697 -12,325 -26,168 -6,240 $1,064,944,258 
B. Property Crimes 1,653 1,141 201 941 -18,498 -99,452 -9,295 $93,563,228 
C. Drug Crimesa 1,004 NA 6,431 7,435 -20,087 -24,922 -9,413 $185,292,728 
Total -50,910 -150,541 -24,948 $1,391,301,234 367,046 $1,435,149,860 0.94 
Ages 19-24 
A. Violent Crimes 33,406 135 7,399 40,697 -14,182 -30,110 -7,180 $1,225,398,740 
B. Property Crimes 1,653 1,141 201 941 -10,512 -56,516 -5,282 $53,169,892 
C. Drug Crimesa 1,004 NA 6,431 7,435 -11,088 -13,757 -5,196 $102,281,364 
Total -35,782 -100,383 -17,658 $1,407,070,502 - - 1.90 
Notes: Costs of violent and property crimes are weighted averages of the breakdown costs from Lochner and Moretti (2004) using average share of crimes composing each of the categories as 
weights. Costs of drug crimes are based on the US Department of Justice (2011) victim costs and other crime costs, and incarceration costs are scaled in the same way as Lochner and Moretti 
(2004). Estimated change in arrests are calculated based on the results from Table 4 scaled using 1993 population within the age groups. Estimated crimes and incarcerations are calculated using 
2009 clearances rates and conviction to incarceration rates respectively for each type of crime. Estimated change in enrolment is calculated using the results from Table 7 Column (4) scaled using 
the 1993 population within the age groups. Yearly costs per pupil (3,910) correspond to the average pupil costs (U.S. Department of Education, 2016) from 1974 to 2014. All figures are deflated 
to 1993 dollars. 
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
Appendix A: Data Description 
A1. Panel Data on Arrests 
Panel data for the US come from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The measure of 
crime is arrests. The UCR reports the number of arrests by year, state, age, gender and type 
of crime. The original data identifies the number of arrests by law enforcement agencies 
within states. We construct a county-level panel on arrests by aggregating the number of 
arrests over law enforcement agencies within a county. Within the UCR, data for certain 
agencies is systematically missing. For example, New York City systematically does not 
report arrest numbers. For the agencies used in our estimation we impose a reporting pattern 
consistent with a maximum tolerance of one missing year per discontinuity window (i.e. for 
10-year bandwidth the agency needs to report 18 out of the 20 years)25.   
In addition, the UCR reports the total population for each law enforcement agency in the 
reported year. Aggregating the UCR population count to the county-year level and comparing 
that number to official population counts allows us to identify county-year covering ratio. 
The weighted average county-level covering ratio is 89% for the 5-year bandwidth. When 
estimating the population per age-sex cell, we use the SEER*Stat population estimates26 at 
county level and apply the yearly covering ratios homogeneously across different ages. The 
implicit assumption is that the missing population has the same age breakdown as the overall 
county-year population. The weighted average share of state population covered in the 5-year 
bandwidth is 81% for reform states. 
We sample males aged 15 to 24 from 1974 to 2015. The UCR data are grouped by age 
category. From age 15 up to the age of 24, the number of arrests is measured by single age 
year.  
Following the literature, we categorize arrests into property and violent crime using the UCR 
offense code variable as follows: 
Violent crime: Property crime: Drug Crime: 
01A = Murder and non-
negligent manslaughter 
05 = Burglary – breaking or 
entering 
18 = Drug Violations 
(Possession, Sale and 
Manufacturing) 
01B = Manslaughter by 
negligence 
06 = Larceny – theft (except 
motor vehicle) 
02 = Forcible rape 07 = Motor vehicle theft 
03 = Robbery 09 = Arson 
04 = Aggravated assault 
08 = Other assaults 
25
 Table 2, column (1) sample includes only agencies reporting at least 10 years over 1974-2015. The results 
are robust to a stricter reporting of all years in the bandwidth period. 
26
 See Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) Program of the National Cancer Institute (NCI) 
1969-2014. 
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In order to produce arrest rates, we aggregate the number of arrests for the above categories 
and divide the resulting number of arrests by the annual county-age-year population. Some 
cells report 0% arrest rates, however for those we assume the lowest arrest rate reported in 
the sample period. Cell reporting arrest rates above 40% are excluded from the sample to 
avoid outliers influencing the analysis.27  
A2. Racial Breakdown Covariates 
An analogous method to one used to obtain population age-sex cell in A1 is performed to 
estimate the racial breakdown of each cell. We use the racial population estimates collected 
from SEER*Stat at county-year level and the county covering ratio to estimate the number 
of population by race for each sex-county-year cell. 
A3. Police Numbers 
The police numbers used are collected from FBI LEOKA (which is available from 1960-
2015). This data reports several police enforcement measures yearly for each enforcement 
agency. We use the total number of sworn officers per county-year as the measure of police 
force present at the geographic area of interest. 
A4. County-Year Economic and Employment Covariates 
Information on economic and employment indicators at county-year level are collected from 
Local Area Personal Income (LAPI) from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 1960-2015. 
Measures of total employment, personal income, wage income and several others are 
available at county-year level from LAPI. 
A5. School Quality Measures 
We use the Local Education Agency (LEA) level data available in the Common Core Data 
(CCD) from National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), both fiscal and non-fiscal28, to 
produce the school quality measures. By aggregating both the number of students, teachers 
and instruction salary expenses at county-year level, we are able to compute estimates of 
pupil-teacher ratio and average teacher salary. We interpolate missing years in the data, these 
are not frequent and do not affect the general results.  
A6. ACS 2006-2015: Education and Work 
We sample all males aged 19-60 from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) for 
the American Community Survey (ACS) 2006-201529. The sample is restricted to US born 
individuals as to ensure the individuals are directly affected by the compulsory schooling 
laws enacted. 
27
 The results are robust to the use of 30% and 50% thresholds alike. 
28
 Unfortunately, fiscal information at LEA level is only available since 1989. 
29
 Despite the fact that ACS started being collected as a 1% sample in 2005, this year is not included in the 
sample analysis given the empirical break in the education variables between 2005 and 2006. 
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Years of schooling are coded according to Acemoglu and Autor (2011). High school dropout 
is defined as an individual who has less than a high school graduation diploma or equivalent. 
Work and school indicator function is defined for an individual who is either classified as 
currently employed or attending school (college or high school) both full-time or part-time. 
Weekly and hourly wages are coded for both part-time and full-time workers (excluding self-
employed and unpaid family workers) according to Acemoglu and Autor (2011) with minor 
improvements on top coding by making the adjustments state-specific according to the ACS 
sample design. 
Reforms are matched by state of birth, as it is assumed that an individual born in a given state 
has attended school in that same state at least until dropout age. When matching the reforms 
to the individual data from ACS, a one-year sliding on the reform year is observed and 
adjusted for. The previous arises due to the inability to precisely estimate the year of birth 
for a given individual as data is collected over different months for each survey year and state, 
and only age is provided in the ACS hence making year of birth an approximated variable.  
A7. CPS Monthly Basic 1976-2015: School Attendance 
We sample all males aged 16-18 from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
archive of the Basic Monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) 1976-2015. Unlike with the 
ACS sample, we are not able to distinguish between US born and migrants in the CPS 
consistently through the sample period. Summer months (June, July and August) are 
excluded from the sample as they consistently report significantly low enrollment in high 
school or college. 
High school attendance definition before 1984 is based on the answer to the question “What 
was your main activity last week?”30 being “School” conditional on the individual not having 
any education attainment superior to high school graduation. After 1984, individuals are 
directly questioned about their enrollment status differentially between high school and 
college31. We, therefore, define an individual as attending high school if he/she declares to 
be enrolled in high school conditional not having any education attainment superior to high 
school graduation. We analyze the sample period when both questions are available (1984-
1993) and conclude that, conditional on the individual not having any education attainment 
superior to high school graduation, 91% of the individuals stating to be enrolled in high 
school answered “School” as their main activity last week. This attests for the strong 
correlation between both measures, dissipating concerns on significant jumps in the variable 
of school attendance between periods.  
In CPS individuals do not report their state of birth, hence reforms are matched by state of 
residence. Considering that school attendance is being measured contemporaneously, we 
have no strong reason to believe that individuals between 16 and 18 years of age would not 
be subject to the school dropout age of their state of residence. When matching the reforms 
to the individual data from ACS and CPS, a one-year sliding on the reform year is observed 
and adjusted for. The previous arises due to the inability to precisely estimate the year of 
birth for a given individual as data is collected over different months for each survey year 
30
 This question was discontinued in 1994.  
31
 This variable is only available for individuals 16 or older, hence the sample of the analysis starting at age 16 
and not earlier despite a few reforms potentially affecting younger ages. 
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and state, and only age is provided in the ACS and CPS hence making year of birth an 
approximated variable.  
A8. Compulsory Schooling Laws 
Compulsory schooling laws are collected directly from official annotated statutes of each 
state in the Westlaw International Database for each of the corresponding years. When 
provided in the statutes, the effective date of the new law is taken as the year of reform 
otherwise enactment year is assumed to be the most sensible approximation.  
The data retrieved includes maximum entry age, minimum leaving age and education grade 
which exempts a child from staying in school. The laws have historically increased in their 
complexity adding several exemptions including work permits and early age parental consent 
letters to exemplify the most common. The Labor Standards Act 1939 harmonized child 
labour laws across states in the US, recent changes were not of a comparable order of 
magnitude as the ones seen during that period. To be consistent we ignore the possibility of 
parental consent authorizations to leave school at an age below the minimum dropout age, as 
these are often seen as exceptions rather than the rule.  
A9. Australia - Queensland Earning or Learning Reform 
Analogously to the US case, the school system in Queensland consists of 12 years of 
education (grades 1 to 12). Prior to the enactment of the Earning or Learning reform of 2006, 
students were required to attend school until either completing grade 10 or turning 16 
whichever occurred first, this structure of compulsory attendance is in every expect 
equivalent to US states with grade exemption clauses. 
The Earning or Learning reform introduced a compulsory participation obligation. According 
to the reform, young people were mandated to participate in a range of activities broadly 
defined as earning or learning for up to an additional two years. Thus, the compulsory 
participation phase required youth to either stay on at school until obtaining a high school 
Senior Certificate; complete a vocational education Certificate III; or participate in paid 
employment for at least 25 hours per week until turning age 17. 
All three dimensions covered by the Australian reform are present in different reforms 
analysed in the US. The toughening of grade exemption to high school completion status was 
enacted by Iowa, Maine, Michigan, New Mexico, Rhode Island and Washington. Vocational 
education as optional route was included in both California and Texas changes. Finally, 
employment permit and certificates as proof of full-time work are required in several states 
in order to request exception from compulsory school attendance when below the legal 
dropout age. 
 A10. Australia - Queensland Microdata 
Australian analysis is based on Queensland administrative data matched at the individual 
level across state agencies, Department of Education and Training (DET) and the Queensland 
Police Service (QPS). The former enables to construct a panel of individual record data for 
the entire population of attendees at publicly funded schools matched with their individual 
criminal offence data for the period 2002 to 2013. The data used is the extract from Beatton, 
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Kidd, Machin and Sarkar (2018) which was kindly made available for our analysis by Tony 
Beatton and Michael Kidd. In order to assure comparability with the US analysis, we focus 
on males ages 15 to 23. 
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Table A1. Coverage of Counties 
 
State (Year) 
 
 
Covered Counties / Total Counties 
 
% Within County Coverage  
 
% Overall State Coverage  
    
Arizona (1985/86) 14 / 16 85.0% 91.3% 
Arkansas (1981) 62 / 75 85.3% 83.2% 
Arkansas (1991) 73 / 75 88.8% 90.6% 
California (1987) 58 / 58 96.0% 95.1% 
Colorado (2008) 55 / 64 87.9% 86.0% 
Connecticut (2002) 8 / 8 71.6% 95.5% 
Illinois (2006)a 1 / 102a 53.7% 22.2% 
Indiana (1989) 37 / 92 51.5% 42.4% 
Indiana (1992) 38 / 92 52.8% 43.6% 
Iowa (1992) 89 / 99 86.1% 80.9% 
Kentucky (1984) 94 / 120 74.7% 67.1% 
Louisiana (1988) 36 / 64 72.7% 55.2% 
Louisiana (2002) 42 / 64 70.4% 61.4% 
Maine (1981) 16 / 16 94.3% 94.4% 
Michigan (1997) 77 / 83 84.8% 85.0% 
Michigan (2010) 78 / 83 91.9% 93.7% 
Mississippi (1984) 24 / 82 40.3% 23.6% 
Missouri (2009) 108 / 114 82.2% 90.4% 
Nebraska (2005) 56 / 93 86.5% 84.2% 
Nevada (2008) 15 / 17 95.8% 97.3% 
New Hampshire (2010) 10 / 10 56.6% 55.6% 
New Mexico (1981) 19 / 34 58.0% 50.8% 
Rhode Island (2003) 5 / 5 98.6% 98.8% 
South Dakota (2010) 29 / 66 84.3% 66.1% 
Texas (1985) 223 / 254 89.1% 92.2% 
Texas (1990) 235 / 254 94.9% 95.9% 
Texas (1998) 230 / 254 95.1% 96.8% 
Virginia (1991) 124 / 142 98.7% 93.4% 
Washington (1996) 36 / 39 79.6% 51.9% 
Wyoming (1999) 22/23 92.0% 94.1% 
    
Notes: Coverage ratios are computed by dividing the population covered in the arrest data by the population estimated from the SEER*Stats for the respective geographies: county 
and state. 
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Table A2:  Balancing Tests 
Balancing Covariates 
-5 years +5 years Difference 
(Standard Error) 
Share of Black 0.136 
(0.006) 
0.136 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
Share of Others 0.049 
(0.005) 
0.059 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
Share of Female 0.484 
(0.001) 
0.483 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Log Police 6.872 
(0.140) 
7.002 
(0.133) 
0.130 
(0.193) 
Log Population 8.028 
(0.136) 
8.041 
(0.126) 
0.013 
(0.185) 
Teacher-Pupil Ratio 18.32 
(0.537) 
17.73 
(0.573) 
-0.581 
(0.776) 
Notes: Sample includes cohorts of males aged 15-24 for US counties over time. Means across all counties in 
the balanced sample for each of the 30 reforms (as in Table 1), on each side of the +/- 5 bandwidth. Estimates 
are weighted by population size and standard errors are clustered at reform-cohort level.  
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Table A3: Discontinuity Estimates by Individual Reform 
State Effective School Year All Ages 
Arizona 1985 and 1986 -0.036 (0.021) 
Arkansas 1981 -0.059 (0.038) 
Arkansas 1991 -0.068 (0.043) 
California 1987 -0.046 (0.008) 
Colorado 2008 -0.102 (0.033) 
Connecticut 2002 -0.008 (0.023) 
Illinois 2006 -0.012 (0.023) 
Indiana 1989 -0.076 (0.039) 
Indiana 1992 0.008 (0.038) 
Iowa 1992 0.017 (0.048) 
Kentucky 1984 -0.099 (0.041) 
Louisiana 1988 -0.083 (0.044) 
Louisiana 2002 -0.081 (0.043) 
Maine 1981 -0.019 (0.031) 
Michigan 1997 -0.066 (0.020) 
Michigan 2010 -0.096 (0.021) 
Mississippi 1984 0.032 (0.062) 
Missouri 2009 -0.055 (0.033) 
Nebraska 2005 0.019 (0.041) 
Nevada 2008 0.027 (0.032) 
New Hampshire 2010 -0.009 (0.041) 
New Mexico 1981 -0.077 (0.065) 
Rhode Island 2003 0.036 (0.028) 
South Dakota 2010 -0.002 (0.077) 
Texas 1985 0.090 (0.015) 
Texas 1990 -0.071 (0.014) 
Texas 1998 -0.080 (0.012) 
Virginia 1991 -0.138 (0.029) 
Washington 1996 -0.063 (0.019) 
Wyoming 1999 -0.112 (0.066) 
Notes: Same specification as column (6) of Table 2. Each row is estimated as 
separate regression for each reform with a 5-year window.
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Table A4: Crime-Age Profile Summary Measures Before and After Dropout Age Changes 
 
 Changes in Crime Age Profile Summary Measures 
  
Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Skewness 
 
Kurtosis 
 
20th Percentile 
 
50th Percentile 
 
80th Percentile 
 
Mode 
 
 
         
Total 0.035 -0.024 -0.012 0.014 0.136 0.075 0.090 0.315 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.065) 
         
Violent 0.044 -0.004 -0.022 -0.012 0.117 0.123 0.165 0.787 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.007) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.093) 
         
Property -0.003 -0.033 0.007 0.034 0.039 -0.015 -0.039 0.400 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.007) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.070) 
         
Drugs 0.156 -0.011 -0.051 -0.015 0.178 0.202 0.218 0.438 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.015) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020) (0.064) 
         
 
  
Notes: Calculated with population weights. Estimates are computed based on the residual arrests after compositionally adjusting at state-level for year, log police employed, 
log population and share of females, black and non-white/non-black population. Texas (1985) is excluded given that is a decrease in compulsory schooling. Discontinuities 
after 2008 are excluded given the unavailability of data to balance ages covered on both sides of the discontinuities. 
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Appendix B 
Theory - Derivations and Proof 
According to the model presented in Section 2, one can derive the following expressions: 
010 = !1 − ()"[%%(()() + )()))()T] − 2%()[%(()() + )()))()] +() V%%!()() + !)() − ()""!)() − ()"TW + 2′()+%!()() + !)() −()""()() − ()), + %%()[!()() + !)() − ()"" − (()() + )())] 
010' = !1 − ()"+%%( ()() + )())(%()() + ()%() + )%()))() +%!()() + !)()"")′(), + ()+%%! ()() + !)() − ()""! %()() +()%() + !)%() − %()""!)() − ()" + %! ()() + !)() − ()""!)′() −%()", + %()+%!()() + !)() − ()""! %()() + ()%() + !)%() −%()"" − ′( ()() + )())(%()() + ()%() + )%()), 
Let 3 = − 45545 be the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and X ≡ ()() + )(),  010 
and 010' can be rewritten as: 
010 = %(X)+−3!1 − ()")()T − 2%())(), + %(X − ())[−3()!)() − ()"T +2%()()() − ())] + %%()[(X − ()) − (X)] 
010' = %(X) V(X′) Y−3)()!1 − ()" − %()ZW + ′(X)+)%()!1 − ()", + ′(X −()) V(X% − %()) Y−3!)() − ()"() + %()ZW + ′(X − ())+!)′() − %()"(), 
010  equals the second derivative of the objective function, assuming we have an interior 
solution,  010 ≤ 0 to ensure the concavity of the objective function. The sign of   ∗'  depends
then on the sign of 010'. 
Lemma 1: 
V%(X) YX′Z Y−3)()!1 − ()" − ′()ZW + +%(X))%()!1 − ()", + +%(X −())!)%() − %()"(),  ≤ −[′(X − ())(X′ − ′ ())(−3()() − ())() + ′ ())] 
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Proposition 
If individuals are risk averse 3 ≥ 0 , wealth is non-decreasing in age X% − %() =%()() + ()%() + !)%() − %()" ≥ 0 , the net rate of return to crime is non-
negative and decreasing in age )() ≥ 0, )%() ≤ 0, and Lemma 1, then the crime age-
profile will be decreasing in age  ∗' ≤ 0  
Proof: 
X% − %() ≥ 0 ⇒  X% ≥ 0  and )%() ≤ 0 ⇒ )%() − ′() ≤ 0 , as %() ≥ 0 , () ≥ 0 
and  ≥ 0 
It follows that: 
%(X) YX′Z Y−3)()(1 − ()) − ′()Z ≤ 0
%(X))%()!1 − ()" ≤ 0 
′(X − ())!)′() − %()"() ≤ 0 
′(X − ()) YX′ − ′()Z Y−3!)() − ()"() + ′()Z ≥ 0
Combined with Lemma 1, this gives 
M\M ≤ 0 ⇒ A∗A ≤ 0 
Model Calibration 
For the model simulation presented in Figure 2 the following functional forms were used: 
() = (1 + (() − )() + (() − ()))]:^ − 11 − _ , ℎ _ = 2 
() = a?(1 + ) 
() =  + (1 + ) ∗ a?(1 + ), ℎ  = 0.55 
() = S + (8') − 1, ℎ  = 0.3 
() = d0.5   < 1    ≥   
 = 0.3, ′ = 0.4 , () = , 0 ≤  ≤ 1 , 0 ≤  ≤ 1 
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1565 Richard Murphy 
Felix Weinhardt 
Gill Wyness 
Who Teaches the Teachers? A RCT of Peer-
to-Peer Observation and Feedback in 181 
Schools 
1564 Paola Conconi 
Giovanni Facchini 
Max F. Steinhardt 
Maurizio Zanardi 
The Political Economy of Trade and 
Migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress 
1563 Stephen Gibbons 
Stephan Heblich 
Ted Pinchbeck 
The Spatial Impacts of a Massive Rail 
Disinvestment Program: The Beeching Axe 
1562 Helen Johnson 
Sandra McNally 
Heather Rolfe 
Jenifer Ruiz-Valenzuela, 
Robert Savage 
Janet Vousden 
Clare Wood 
Teaching Assistants, Computers and 
Classroom Management: Evidence from a 
Randomised Control Trial 
1561 Daniel J. Graham 
Stephen Gibbons 
Quantifying Wide Economic Impacts of 
Agglomeration for Transport Appraisal: 
Existing Evidence and Future Directions 
1560 Daniel S. Jacks 
Dennis Novy 
Market Potential and Global Growth over the 
Long Twentieth Century 
1559 Alan Manning 
Paolo Masella 
Diffusion of Social Values through the Lens of 
US Newspapers 
1558 Jan David Bakker 
Stephan Maurer 
Jörn-Steffen Pischke 
Ferdinand Rauch 
Of Mice and Merchants: Trade and Growth in 
the Iron Age 
1557 Giuseppe Berlingieri 
Sara Calligaris 
Chiara Criscuolo 
The Productivity-Wage Premium: Does Size 
Still Matter in a Service Economy? 
1556 Christian A.L. Hilber 
Olivier Schöni 
The Economic Impacts of Constraining 
Second Home Investments 
1555 Filippo Di Mauro 
Fadi Hassan 
Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano 
Financial Markets and the Allocation of 
Capital: The Role of Productivity 
1554 Keith Head 
Yao Amber Li 
Asier Minondo 
Geography, Ties and Knowledge Flows: 
Evidence from Citations in Mathematics 
1553 Nicholas Bloom 
Kalina Manova 
Stephen Teng Sun 
John Van Reenen 
Zhihong Yu 
Managing Trade: Evidence from China and 
the US 
1552 Gabriel M. Ahlfeldt 
Wolfgang Maennig 
Steffen Q. Mueller 
The Generation Gap in Direct Democracy 
1551 Keith Head 
Tierry Mayer 
Brands in Motion: How Frictions Shape  
Multinational Production 
1550 Natalie Chen 
Dennis Novy 
Currency Unions, Trade and Heterogeneity 
1549 Felipe Carozzi The Role of Demand in Land Re-Development 
1548 Nick Bloom 
Brian Lucking 
John Van Reenen 
Have R&D Spillovers Changed? 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7673 Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Website: http://cep.lse.ac.uk Twitter: @CEP_LSE 
